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The Smallest Leap of Faith:  
a New Worldview for a Postmodern World? 
Kelly C. Smith1 
1Department of Philosophy & Religion, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, 29634, USA 
 
Abstract  
  It is undeniable that religion provides a sense of purpose, ethical direction, and social belonging that most human beings 
for most of recorded history have found to be profoundly important.  But it is equally undeniable that its supernatural 
metaphysics and dogmatic conservatism have retarded society’s progress in many ways and caused untold human suffering.  
An obvious question is thus: Is it possible to preserve the beneficial aspects of religion but excise the problematic ones?     
  Immanuel Kant fathered the postmodern age with his devastating critique of the possibility of human knowledge of the 
Ultimate.  However, Kant himself was far from skeptical about the possibility of objective human knowledge - as long as 
its claims were carefully qualified.  The key to understanding this seeming contradiction is his (often misunderstood) 
transcendental method.  The method offers a way to have our postmodern skepticism concerning traditional religious su-
pernaturalism and still eat our metaphysical cake, as it were.   
  Combining a transcendental approach with new scientific findings about the nature of the universe may allow us trans-
cend the stalemate between scientific rationalism and faith, constructing a belief system which blends positive elements of 
each perspective. Scientists in a number of disciplines are beginning to hypothesize that the universe naturally creates 
complexity.  On the one hand, this undercuts the most common justification for belief in the supernatural, since there is no 
need for divine intervention to explain things that occur naturally.  On the other hand, it invites those so inclined to view 
themselves as part of a universal telos involving the creation of complexity.  Such a move requires only the smallest step 
of faith to adopt and may provide believers with the sense of purpose, ethical foundation, and social support they long for 
while sidestepping conflict with the essential claims and methods of science. 
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1. Introduction 
Every mind must make its choice between truth  
and repose. It cannot have both. – R.W. Emerson 
 
 Science and faith have a long and tempestuous rela-
tionship.  There have been times when they worked har-
moniously together, as during the natural theology move-
ment that produced scientists like Newton and Darwin, but 
also times when they have fought hammer and tong, as 
when the Catholic Church used its coercive power to re-
press scientific views that threatened religious dogma.  
The current situation is complex, with signs of both re-
newed tension and promising convergence.   Unfortu-
nately, it’s rare for interlocutors who debate these issues in 
the fora of public opinion to exhibit much appreciation for 
the subtleties of the conceptual terrain – a state of affairs 
that insures such exchanges produce much heat but little 
light. 
 As a corrective to this frenetic myopia, I will first place 
the relationship between science and faith within a broad 
historical context by comparing the intellectual origins of 
science with those of the so called postmodern worldview.  
Then I will do what philosophers are often uniquely posi-
tioned to do:  identify the essential contours of the con-
ceptual forest by stepping back from the distracting details 
of particular trees.  This will allow us to see some ways in 
which both sides have gone beyond their remits to create 
unnecessary problems.  After delineating a possibility 
space for a “minimal faith” consistent with the essential 
commitments of both sides, I then discuss the complex uni-
verse hypothesis as a concrete example of a scientific hy-
pothesis that suggests a way to fill this space. Of course, as 
with any compromise, this requires both sides to make con-
cessions, and is thus a position guaranteed to have many 
detractors. Fortunately, however, my present purpose is not 
to solve the problem at one fell swoop, but simply to sug-
gest a more fruitful direction for further conversations. 
2. Historical Overview  
2.1. The Scientific Revolution 
The first principle is that you must not fool yourself –  
and you are the easiest person to fool. – R. Feynman 
 
  It is of course impossible to do justice to the complex 
religious, philosophical and scientific development of the 
last 300 years in only a few paragraphs. It is with trepida-
tion, therefore, that I attempt to trace a few of the main 
themes in intellectual history that underlie the genesis and 
nature of postmodern thought.  I beg the reader’s indul-
gence with this preface however, since it is critical for un-
derstanding both the current tension between religion and 
science as well as an avenue for a possible rapprochement. 
  We are all familiar with the standard account of the sci-
entific revolution as the beginning of a new age of reason 
and optimism following the long dark night of the Middle 
Ages.  For thousands of years, homage to long dead think-
ers, enforced by the church, strangled independent thought.  
But with the removal of these barriers, science blossomed 
and, with it, our ability to provide explanations of natural 
phenomena.  Philosophers label this interval, stretching 
from roughly the beginning of the 17th to the middle of the 
19th centuries, the modern period. 
  This was a time characterized by an unbounded optimism 
concerning our collective capacity to explain the universe 
and solve our problems thereby.  The familiar example of 
the development of modern astronomy provides a stock 
illustration of the process:  Copernicus’ theory of a helio-
centric solar system was initially opposed by the church, an 
opposition that culminated in the infamous trial and con-
demnation of Galileo.  But science had the last laugh, as 
the heliocentric idea was taken up by new men of science 
like Brahe and Kepler, then rapidly enshrined within the 
powerful new paradigm of Newtonian physics.  By the end 
of the modern age, the church was in full retreat and science 
seemed poised to solve all the mysteries of the heavens. 
  As science became more professionalized, it began to 
pull away from natural philosophy, concentrating on empir-
ical investigations.  But the theoretical philosophers were 
still part of the movement, working to provide an explana-
tion for the success of these new methods.  Initially, transi-
tional figures like Descartes and Leibniz argued that it was 
our innate rational gift, bestowed by a benevolent God and 
exemplified by the elegance of mathematics, that allowed 
us to uncover the truths of the natural world [1,2]. But it 
was not long before a new type of empiricist began to argue 
that we come to know, not through the operations of a mys-
terious reason, but only by careful induction applied to the 
data of perception [3,4].  The new scientists quickly 
adopted this empirical philosophy as the appropriate foun-
dation of their work – a marriage that persists to this day. 
2.2. The Problem of Induction 
Everything should be made as simple as possible,  
but not simpler. – A. Einstein 
 
  But no marriage is without its difficulties.  Though it 
does an excellent job of giving voice to the empirical atti-
tudes embraced by science, as a metaphysical doctrine, em-
piricism leaves much to be desired.  This point was made 
most persuasively in a critique of the powers of empiricism 
by one of its early adopters, David Hume [5].  He uncov-
ers what he labeled “the problem of induction,” showing 
that empiricism establishes a standard of knowledge it can 
not itself meet, thus revealing a fundamental contradiction 
at its very foundation that has not been satisfactorily re-
solved to this day.  The argument is relatively simple: 
1. Empiricists claim we know nothing that we do not 
derive from experience, a move that prevents the 
importation of unjustified “knowledge” through 
intuition, revelation, etc. 
2. To discover truth, therefore, we must always begin 
with the data of experience, and induce the regu-
larities of nature from this.  For example, we ob-
serve that an object falls to earth whenever re-
leased, so we induce that all such objects will al-
ways behave this way under similar circumstances.  
In time, such observations are enshrined as “laws 
of nature” and are used to make precise predictions 
that can be tested.  Whatever honorific you apply 
to the resulting regularity, however, the logic re-
mains inductive. 
3. But causal reasoning like this requires that the 
universe will continue to behave in a uniform 
fashion or we would have no grounds to predict 
the future based on the past.  Hume called this 
assumption of uniformity “the principle of induc-
tion” and observed that all causal reasoning, and 
thus all empirical induction, rests on this principle. 
4. But the principle of induction can’t be justified, for 
to attempt an empirical justification of a principle 
required for empirical justification would be pa-
tently circular.  And, since the empiricist holds 
that all knowledge must be generated empirically, 
there is no other option. 
5. The intellectually honest empiricist, therefore, 
must admit that her entire system of knowledge 
rests on a principle that is not only unsupported in 
fact, but unsupportable in principle.   
6. Since a chain of reasoning is only as strong as it 
weakest link, all conclusions of empiricism (and 
thus of science) are rendered highly suspect.  
  This puts empiricism in the epistemically awkward posi-
tion of espousing a method that seems to work very well, 
but in a way they can neither explain nor justify. The best 
they can do is point to the fact of their success and hope that 
it continues.  Of course, one time-honored option in the 
face of such a daunting philosophical problem is to simply 
ignore it – an approach advocated by Hume himself and 
imitated by the few practicing scientists aware of the di-
lemma.  In one sense, there is nothing wrong with such a 
pragmatic approach, especially given the enormous success 
science has achieved using it, but at the very least the ex-
istence of this unresolved problem should engender a cer-
tain metaphysical modesty on the part of scientists. 
2.3. A Cure Worse than the Disease? 
Sapere aude! 'Have courage to use your own reason!'  
- that is the motto of enlightenment. – I. Kant 
 
  Immanuel Kant was a philosopher who took Hume’s 
challenge seriously – indeed, more seriously than Hume 
himself [6].  If science is so critical to our understanding 
of the universe, he reasoned, it must be possible to place it 
on a firm epistemic foundation, which requires defusing the 
problem of induction. And so he set out to do just this, 
though whether and in what sense he succeeded in this pro-
ject is still a matter of debate.  
  Kant accepts the empiricist idea that we have no direct 
access to information about the “real” world (noumena) 
beyond our mental representations (phenomena).  Since 
metaphysics is about the ultimate nature of reality, any em-
piricist making metaphysical claims is in the awkward posi-
tion of using sensation as a guide to the supposedly ex-
tra-sensory causes of sensation.  To make matters worse, 
Kant argues persuasively that our sensation is not a passive 
faculty on which the world impresses itself, but instead in-
volves active (if subconscious) interpretation (a claim rich-
ly confirmed by modern psychology).  This makes it im-
possible to know the nature of the world beyond our expe-
rience with any confidence – we are trapped in our own 
minds, as it were.  To use a simple analogy, it’s as if we 
spend our entire lives locked inside a movie theatre with 
only the images on the screen as a guide to the outside 
world.  We have no way to tell whether and to what extent 
the images correspond to what’s outside.  And since we 
also know that our expectations and desires influence what 
see on the screen, we have strong grounds to be skeptical 
about any claim concerning the world beyond the theatre. 
  This is a radically pessimistic conclusion, to be sure, but 
Kant argues that we must not deceive ourselves about our 
epistemic situation or pretend it is otherwise.  We can nev-
er know the true nature of the reality beyond our senses, 
period.  Surprisingly, though, he does not think this im-
plies skepticism.  His unique insight is that, while we can 
never know anything definite about ultimate reality, we can 
know something about the ways we structure its influence 
on our experience.  In essence, he argues that there are 
certain structural properties (categories) of the experiential 
world that are necessary for the function of reason.  Thus, 
as rational creatures, we must think the way we do.  
  One of the necessary features of our perceptual world are 
causal relationships, a fact which allows us to justify the 
principle of induction, albeit not in the way we might wish. 
To put it bluntly, although we will never know whether 
things like causal relationships are real, we can know that, 
even if they are illusions, they are illusions that will be 
shared by all other rational creatures.  Casual reasoning 
accurately portrays the mental worlds of all rational crea-
tures - human, animal, alien or even divine - and this in-
ter-subjectivity is as close to metaphysical truth as we will 
ever get.  
  Given such an intuitively unsettling conclusion, it should 
come as no surprise that opinions differ on whether this 
constitutes a victory for human knowledge.  Indeed, the 
history of philosophy following Kant can plausibly be di-
vided into two general camps based on reaction to his ideas.  
Those who take all of Kant’s conclusions seriously go on to 
found what is typically described as “analytic philosophy”, 
where the goal is seen as precisely delineating what we can 
and can’t know and in what ways.  But those who reject 
his account of our limited objectivity are put on a very pes-
simistic path indeed.  This is the seed of postmodernism. 
 
 
2.4. Postmodernism is Born 
“In the consciousness of the truth he has perceived, man 
now sees everywhere only the awfulness or the absurdity of 
existence and loathing seizes him. – F. Nietzsche 
 
  Kant’s philosophy had an electric effect on philosophy, 
catalyzing the formation of German idealism in the late 18th 
century.  These philosophers tried in various ways to come 
to grips with what the devastating swath Kant had cut 
through traditional epistemology and metaphysics [7,8].  
One common approach was to simply accept our inability to 
find ever find truth – in other words, to adopt a radical form 
of epistemic pessimism.  This sense of pessimism gained 
strength in the 19th century from a complex series of social 
and intellectual developments.  A time of rapid social 
change, the dawn of the industrial revolution saw social 
upheaval that prompted many thinkers (most famously 
Marx and Engels) to argue for overthrowing the old politi-
cal systems.  Scientific systems were also being chal-
lenged in ways that lent momentum to the pessimistic spirit 
of the age.  For example, the publication of Darwin’s 
Origin of Species made it difficult to defend the traditional 
claim that human reason was anything terribly special, since 
it evolved from much simpler systems in non-human ani-
mals via a process that, if not random, at least showed no 
evidence of direction or purpose. And the pointless slaugh-
ter of the great war at the beginning of the 20th century 
proved the final nail in the coffin of modern optimism. 
  Thus grew the movement known popularly as postmod-
ernism.  It’s important to note immediately that this term 
conceals more than it reveals, as there is much more diver-
sity and nuance here than most people realize.  The term 
has been used to lump together a variety of distinct philo-
sophical schools and methods (e.g., existentialism, critical 
theory, deconstructionism, nihilism, etc.) as well as a num-
ber of less precise attitudes and dispositions that don’t rise 
to the level of a philosophical system.  Since my goal at 
present is not to attempt a thorough classification of these 
views, but rather to position the conflict between science 
and religion within a broad intellectual trend, I will use the 
term “postmodern” somewhat loosely.  However one de-
cides to apply the terminology, it is fair to say that, just as 
the modern era was characterized by an unbounded opti-
mism concerning the possibility of human knowledge and 
progress, the postmodern era is marked by an extremely 
pessimistic attitude towards all claims to truth, purpose and 
meaning.  
  This creates an existential problem that is perhaps best 
illustrated in Camus’ Myth of Sisyphus [9]. Sisyphus was 
the mythological King of Corinth punished by the Gods for 
an insufficiently reverential attitude (and in particular, an 
attempt to cheat death).  His punishment consisted of be-
ing forced to push a huge boulder up a hill, only to watch it 
roll back down again just as he reached the top.  He was 
consigned to this repetitive, fruitless toil for all eternity, 
without any hope of relief or illusion of purpose.  For Ca-
mus, to contemplate Sisyphus’ horrific plight is to confront 
the situation we all are in, even if most of us refuse to ac-
cept it for what it is.  In pursuing truth without flinching, 
and in particular by refusing to be lulled into the illusion of 
purpose and meaning those in authority foist on the unsus-
pecting, the postmodern thinker dooms herself to a life of 
pointless suffering and toil.  She knows that she is hope-
lessly adrift in the sea of meaningless chaos that is our uni-
verse, and is forced to conclude that life is absurd.   
  This attitude, like the scientific attitude, has seeped into 
our modern cultural norms in ways that are not always ap-
preciated. Educated westerners are likely to assume, with-
out much critical reflection, a skeptical orientation to claims 
that used to be widely accepted.  Thus, we are more likely 
now than ever before to reject broad metaphysical claims 
(e.g., religious, scientific) and remain steadfastly dubious 
about the possibility of objective standards (e.g., ethical, 
aesthetic).  Certainly, the debate between science and reli-
gion in popular culture has been influenced by a postmod-
ern view of intellectual exchange. Because there are no ap-
proved standards, the goal of modern “debate” (here and 
elsewhere) is not a shared, if competitive, search for truth, 
but rather the utter destruction of one’s opponent by any 
means necessary, including rhetorical dirty tricks. 
  If the postmodernist is right and there really is no purpose 
or point to life, we have limited options.  We can: 
1. Avoid the problem by ignoring it. 
2. Avoid the problem by committing suicide.  
3. Accept the problem and suffer. 
4. Accept the problem and learn to love the absurd. 
5. Accept the problem and find a non-objective 
source of purpose. 
  The first option, while popular, is either an act of igno-
rance or a willful rejection of the truth.  Either way, it’s not 
something anyone devoted to the truth can endorse and the 
postmodern philosopher (if not always the postmodernist 
more generally) is just as devoted to the search for truth as 
the scientist - she is just extremely skeptical about our abil-
ity to find it.  Not surprisingly, the temptation to kill one-
self and thus end the farce is a very common theme in 
postmodern discussions.  However, postmodernists have 
the same basic psychological makeup as the rest of us, 
which includes robust psychological mechanisms to prevent 
self destruction.  They thus often express a longing for 
suicide as something they should do if they could only 
overcome their animal natures – a position Nietzsche labels 
“the most difficult thought” [10].   
  If we accept the postmodern problem, however, it is not 
easy to deal with.  We can simply suffer, of course, but 
most people would reject this option out of hand.  We 
could learn to love the absurd – as Camus puts it, “we must 
imagine Sisyphus happy.” But this is a bit like telling 
someone in great pain: “It’s mind over matter – if you don’t 
mind, it doesn’t matter.” While undeniably true, very few 
people find such advice helpful.   
  Our final option is to discover a source of meaning for 
ourselves.  But this is not easy either.  Since postmodern-
ism undermines not only all conventional ideas of meaning 
and purpose, but their sources as well (e.g., God, the state), 
we are entirely on our own in the search for meaning.  
Indeed, it is better to say that we are required to create 
meaning rather than to discover it, since there is no privi-
leged place where it might be found.   Some postmodern 
philosophers believe this can be done – for example, by 
devoting oneself to living an authentic life [11,12].  While 
this is probably easier to achieve than learning to love ab-
surdity, for our purposes it suffices to note that it is still 
extremely difficult – to the point where its attainment elud-
ed some of the greatest postmodern thinkers.   
  What are we to do in the face of this dilemma?  There is 
at least one other option not listed above – the leap to faith. 
Kierkegaard [13], himself a foundational postmodern phi-
losopher, famously argued that one must simply choose to 
believe in something that provides objective meaning, de-
spite the lack of evidence (and perhaps even in the face of 
countervailing evidence).  Such a leap is subjective in the 
sense that is a purely personal choice without objective ev-
idence.  But it is also objective, at least in the sense that 
what one subjectively believes in is a source of objective 
truth.    
  Of course, the most common sort of leap is into some 
kind of traditional religion, since this provides a complex 
and ready made system of values.  In principle, however, a 
leap could be toward anything that allows for a sense of 
objective purpose.  Given the commitments underlying 
postmodernism, it is not surprising that most postmodernists 
consider leaping into faith to be a perversion of their ideals.  
And it is certainly at least ironic to use the search for objec-
tive truth to justify what is manifestly at least an arational, 
and perhaps even an irrational, belief system.  But more 
ironic still is the extent to which both sides of the modern 
discourse between science and religious are caught in the 
grip of this worldview without realizing it. 
3. Science vs. Religion 
Only the closed mind is certain. – D. Spanley 
 
  Of course, no thumbnail history such as this can possibly 
do justice to all the complex nuances of the ideas at play 
here.  However, the above discussion does trace one very 
important line of thought that helps explain the origins of 
some of the tensions between science and religion in the 
postmodern world. Now I want to put flesh on this abstract 
discussion by presenting concrete examples of the two op-
ponents in the modern debate between science and religion.  
I present these as caricatures, so they are by definition ex-
aggerations, yet readers will likely see elements of their 
own thinking in one or the other position and neither is so 
extreme that there aren’t real examples of each.  By ex-
amining the extremes, I hope to reveal more clearly where 
the opportunities for compromise lie. 
3.1. The Atheist Scientist 
The greatest empiricists among us are only empiricists on 
reflection: when left to their instincts, they dogmatize like 
infallible popes. – Wm. James 
 
  The atheist scientist is a familiar trope in the modern 
world and has some influential instantiations, particularly 
within the recent neo-atheist movement [14,15,16,17,18].  
He sees himself as engaged in the search for truth using the 
only method untainted by suspect metaphysics – science.   
Like many postmodernists, he is baffled by those with the 
weakness of mind to embrace comforting illusion rather 
than face reality without flinching.  In an act of intellectual 
moralizing, he even asserts that no one deserving the label 
“scientist” could be anything but a confirmed atheist.  He 
is confident that, with the proper education, all humanity 
will eventually shed their childish need for religious myth 
and the world will consequently be a much better place. 
  One basic problem with this attitude, of course, is that 
science does not, and indeed can not, avoid unsupported 
assumptions.  Most scientists are not aware of this, since 
they do not study the philosophical foundations of their own 
discipline, but it is no less true for their lack of insight.  
Even the extremely brief historical background presented 
above suffices to illustrate how two assumptions were in-
dispensible during the emergence of science as a discipline:  
1. The belief that the universe is a kosmos - that is, 
the kind of place that can be explained by human 
reason. 
2. The belief that the empirical methods of science 
are adequate for uncovering the truths of this kos-
mos. 
  The notion that we live in a kosmos is so central to the 
modern, scientific, worldview that people don’t often single 
it out for critical scrutiny. However, it is clear that its adop-
tion was an essential step in the creation of science.  And 
if we are honest, we have to admit that it is not possible to 
justify this claim.  There are always rumblings at the edge 
of one science or another suggesting that our knowledge of 
the universe is somehow fundamentally flawed.  The re-
cent discovery of dark matter and energy, whose existence 
was not even suspected 50 years ago, is a case in point: it is 
becoming increasingly clear that these are actually the 
dominant forces in our universe, yet we have scarcely be-
gun to understand them [19,20].  But debates about the 
scientific anomaly du jour aside, it’s important to realize 
that we will never disprove the possibility that all of our 
scientific knowledge is actually false in a systematic fash-
ion.  For example, some respectable philosophers and sci-
entists have given a modern twist to Kant’s conclusion 
about ultimate reality by suggesting the entire universe may 
be merely a simulation [21,22,23,24].  This implies that 
anything we discover about what we call “the universe,” no 
matter how well supported by empirical evidence, may not 
be about anything real at all.  
  The notion that empiricism suffices to explain natural 
phenomena is more problematic still.  Hume’s problem of 
induction has never been resolved in a way that would make 
a confirmed empiricist happy.  There are thus excellent 
theoretical reasons to be suspicious of any empirical system 
that attempts to bootstrap its own justification.  But the 
dream of a complete empirical system is so seductive that a 
generation of philosophers of science (the logical positivists) 
in the first half of the 20th century tried valiantly to deline-
ate precisely how empirical evidence can support scientific 
claims using elaborate systems of logic [25,26].  Unfortu-
nately, this failed rather spectacularly when these attempts 
actually established that such an account is not logically 
possible [27,28].   
  The atheist scientist also makes problematic assumptions 
about the nature of religion.  Typically, the characteristics 
of the crudest sorts of religious beliefs – those that tend to 
conflict directly with science, for example – are taken to be 
representative of all religions.   Thus, the view espoused 
by young earth creationists that the universe is only a few 
thousand years old is held up as an example of the evils of 
religion, despite the fact that there are large segments of 
traditional religions (including a clear majority of Christians) 
that oppose such silliness [29,30].  More subtly, atheists 
who wish to attack religion typically assume that to be reli-
gious is to believe in a divine being, and in particular one 
who uses his supernatural powers to intervene in the natural 
world.  While there are many who believe precisely this, 
not all religions require belief in God(s) at all (e.g., Taoism, 
Buddhism) and many theologians within monotheistic tra-
ditions have proposed interpretations of divinity which 
avoid supernatural claims [31,32,33].  It has even been 
proposed that certain types of religious claims may be sci-
entifically testable (if perhaps unlikely to be true) [34,35].  
Therefore, the atheist should object, not to religion in gen-
eral, but to certain (admittedly common) types of religious 
belief.   
  Certainly the sad state of scientific literacy in countries 
like the United States is often (rightly) blamed for much of 
the tension between science and religion [36,37].  Howev-
er, the assumption that quality science education will natu-
rally convince people to abandon their religious commit-
ments seems at least highly questionable.  Increasingly, 
scientific investigation into how people actually form opin-
ions reveals that the kinds of abstract reasoning scientists 
and philosophers laud plays a relatively small role [38,39].  
This suggests that most people may never be able to partic-
ipate sufficiently in the scientific enterprise to be able to use 
it as the sole source of meaning and purpose.  If that’s the 
case, presenting the choice as starkly as the atheist scientist 
does will actually be counterproductive, since forces the 
average believer to choose between the mysterious authori-
ty of a religion that plays an important role in their life and 
the mysterious authority of a science from which they de-
rive no comfort.  Given such a choice, should we really be 
surprised when most prefer religion, in whatever form it is 
offered? 
  In one sense, the scientist’s refusal to countenance any 
claim that can’t be rationally justified is critically important, 
since it’s far too easy to fool oneself.  Yet this narrow fo-
cus must be focused narrowly – on the explanations one is 
willing to entertain to explain natural phenomena, not on all 
explanations that could be put forward, even if they are only 
tangentially relevant to the practice of science.  If a faith 
claim neither impinges on the details of natural explanation 
nor gets in the way of naturalistic methodology in general, 
science should ignore it.  Consider the case of creationism:  
some creationists believe things that directly conflict with 
science (e.g., a young Earth).  Science is obliged to vigor-
ously oppose such claims, since they directly conflict with 
extremely well supported science. On the other hand, many 
people will call themselves creationists yet, when pressed to 
clarify, simply claim that the universe, with all its natural 
processes (including evolution), was created by a divine 
being.  There is no scientific need to debate such a claim 
and the atheist scientist who chooses to do so is therefore 
not operating as a scientist, but as someone with his own, 
extra-scientific, worldview.  That is certainly his right, but 
he can’t legitimately claim that the authority of science 
supports such a move. 
  And it’s quite obvious that human needs are richer and 
more diverse than simply explaining the natural world – the 
persistence of religion and other extra-scientific means of 
avoiding postmodern angst establish this beyond much 
doubt.  Creating worldviews that allow people to be happy 
and fulfilled may not be science’s concern, but that makes it 
no less a fundamental human need.  Indeed, science seems 
to realize this in practice if not explicitly, as it is often 
thought to be an important part of the mission of science to 
create a sense of wonder concerning the natural world 
[40,41,42].  What’s more, it seems unlikely this is a need 
that will ever be adequately met by science alone.  That 
does not mean that everyone needs an extra-scientific belief 
system, of course – some individuals may be perfectly con-
tent with science alone, just as some postmodernists may be 
able to create their own personal sense of meaning.  But 
this misses the crucial point that many, perhaps most, peo-
ple will simply not be able to do this.  A science that con-
tinues to push an all or nothing approach to leaps of faith, is 
creating its own enemy - and needlessly so.  
  Thus, the thoughtful scientist must be careful to defend 
science only where a defense is truly necessary.  True, 
science provides no reason to believe in the existence of 
divine beings and this is an important point.  But this is not 
the same as providing evidence that such a being does not 
exist.  The scientific method is a heuristic for investigating 
the natural world, not a complete guide to the nature of re-
ality, at least not in any direct way.  The scientist is thus 
well within her rights to oppose a specific religious claim 
that conflicts with scientific evidence, or to highlight the 
lack of evidence for religious claims in general, or to warn 
about the indirect threat that supernatural beliefs can pose to 
scientific methods.  But true atheism requires one to go 
beyond the available evidence and make a leap of faith of 
one’s own. 
3.2. The Man of Unshakable Faith 
Men think epilepsy divine, merely because they do not  
understand it.  But if they called everything which they  
do not understand divine, why, there would be no end  
to divine things. - Hippocrates 
 
  The man of unshakeable faith is one who believes in a 
traditional monotheistic religion like Christianity based on a 
(relatively) literal reading of ancient texts.  He has no pa-
tience for fancy modern theology and believes in a personal 
God who loves him in a direct way and intervenes in the 
natural world through miracles.  He is eager to use his 
rational powers when they support his faith, but quick to lay 
them aside when they prove inconvenient – indeed, he im-
mediately rejects any claim inconsistent with his own inter-
pretation of scripture, regardless of the weight of evidence 
behind it.  He believes the world would be a much better 
place if others felt as he does and is in favor of a public 
educational system specifically crafted to bring this about.  
Finally, he believes science is ultimately just another type of 
faith - on a par, in some ultimate epistemic sense, with reli-
gion.  Examples of such people are commonplace, but an 
especially rich vein can be found within the creationist 
movement [43,44,45]. 
  One obvious problem here is the origins of this sort of 
belief.  It is an inescapable fact that the vast majority of 
the world’s major religions were created by illiterate peas-
ants living in a pre-scientific age.  The founders of these 
religions were profoundly ignorant of the sorts of truths we 
now expect all children to master at an early age.  There-
fore, whatever insights religions may contain, they are an 
exceptionally poor guide to the workings of the natural 
world.  No position we choose to stake out should get in 
the way of our ability to understand the natural world, since 
this understanding is critical to solving the world’s prob-
lems.  And since science is clearly the best mechanism 
anyone has ever devised for this purpose, no religion should 
set itself against science.  In fact, doing so is actually a 
threat to religion, since it picks a fight with science that it 
will ultimately lose – a point made quite persuasively by the 
head of the U.S. National Institutes of Health and evangeli-
cal Christian, Francis Collins [46].  
  The problem is not the use of ancient texts per se, it’s the 
way the faith claims they embody are accepted without re-
flection.  This may seem an odd thing to say – isn’t the 
whole nature of a leap of faith to accept a claim without 
adequate empirical evidence?  Yes, but that does not ab-
solve believers of their responsibility to carefully consider 
the context of each leap of faith before making it.  It’s one 
thing to carefully consider one’s epistemic situation and 
reluctantly decide that a leap is the only option, and quite 
another to use such a leap as a cheap way to “justify” what 
you want to believe without the hard work of critical reflec-
tion.  Too many believers today approach faith claims far 
too casually, which does not do justice to the seriousness of 
the issues at stake. 
  And it’s not enough to assess the leaps before they are 
made.  Since we live in a world that is constantly changing, 
our leaps must be periodically reassessed in light of new 
circumstance.  Communities of faith thus need to create 
robust and ongoing internal cultures of critique.  Of course, 
some faiths already do this in limited ways, and whatever 
internal systems are or are not in place, religious interpreta-
tions do evolve in response to changes in the world around 
them [16,47].  If this didn’t happen, religions would die.  
But many followers of traditional religions are not taught to 
cherish critique as a healthy part of religion and those so 
inclined to critique tend to have little access to processes for 
impacting official doctrine.  Adherence to ancient texts 
exacerbates the problem, since followers must still regard 
the texts as sacred and true even as interpretations change, 
creating ineliminable tensions.  All too often, change 
comes to religions only fitfully and with great confusion 
and pain.   
  The lack of a systematic critical culture within religion is 
a large part of the reason science is opposed to faith.  The 
fact that some believers have a sensible approach to scien-
tific truths does not mean that most do.  And even the sen-
sible believers don’t always feel a strong responsibility to 
chastise others who take their faith claims too far.  But 
they must, since adopting a belief of any kind is an exercise 
with moral implications [48] and leaps of faith, being di-
vorced from the need for evidence, are fertile grounds for 
dangerous abuse.  Religions should therefore explicitly 
recognize this fact and adopt a collective duty on the part of 
believers to limit the scope of faith claims.  To give just 
one of many possible examples, if moderate Islamic voices 
do not take an explicit stance against Islamic radicalism, 
they are to some extent tacitly endorsing jihad as a legiti-
mate expression of faith.  This is fundamentally different 
from the culture of science, where constant critique is an 
integral part of the process.  Scientists would thus have a 
much easier time accepting leaps of faith if religions were 
more active in policing their ranks for overzealous applica-
tions of faith. 
  People, particularly those influenced by intelligent design 
creationism, often point out that science involves unsup-
portable metaphysical claims such an ontological naturalism.  
I will not respond to that claim specifically, except to note 
that it has been decisively refuted elsewhere [49].  What-
ever the merits of the claim, it illustrates that there is a 
sense among many believers that science is “just another 
faith tradition.”  There is some truth here, of course, since 
as we discussed previously, science does make leaps of faith. 
However, not all leaps of faith are created equal.  The as-
sumptions science makes are the minimal ones that must be 
made in order to pursue rational investigation of the world.  
We can reject them if we wish, but the result will be a mys-
terious universe we can not, in principle, explain.  Reli-
gions, on the other hand, do not typically adopt a minimalist 
approach to leaps of faith.  Indeed, they often embrace, not 
just arational, but irrational revelation, and this is a very 
different matter.   
  In particular, most traditional religions embrace super-
naturalism - where one believes in forces and entities that, 
by definition, flout our scientific understanding of the natu-
ral world.  This is not something science can countenance.  
It’s not that science can establish such claims are false – it 
can’t - but rather that any methodology which accepts su-
pernatural claims is antithetical to the scientific process.  
To accept the existence of something that can not, in princi-
ple, be explained thru human reason, is to open Pandora’s 
box.  We lose all control over what emerges, since believ-
ing in supernatural entities is like embracing a contradiction 
in logic – once you make this move, you can use it to “es-
tablish” anything at all, no matter how contrary to reason.  
The real tension between science and religion lies here, 
since no one committed to the concept of a kosmos can ac-
cept such a move.  Of course, in principle, it is possible to 
endorse a certain kind of supernatural claim without hin-
dering science – for example, that God works his will only 
indirectly, with the natural universe as his instrument. But 
history seems to show that, once such a power is asserted, 
metaphysical claims multiply in a way that will eventually 
pose problems for the rational investigation of the natural 
order. 
  Thus, to the extent that supernaturalism is an inelimina-
ble aspect of religion, science is justified in rejecting a 
broad compromise.  However, as we’ve discussed, super-
naturalism is not a necessary part of religion, even of tradi-
tional monotheistic religions. When the atheist scientist fails 
to appreciate the diversity of religion on this point, his ig-
norance is revealed.  On the other hand, the fact that so 
few religious believers appreciate this point themselves 
makes the scientist’s mistake more understandable. 
3.3. A Metaphysical Opportunity 
One should keep an open mind – but not so open that 
one’s brains fall out. - Bertrand Russell 
 
  I present the two sides of the science v. religion debate as 
caricatures so that we may more easily see some of the es-
sential differences.  Science is by far the best method hu-
mans beings have ever discovered for understanding the 
natural world, with a track record far superior (to put it 
mildly) to revelation in this regard.  It is thus entirely ap-
propriate that scientists refuse to adopt any belief which 
weakens science, either by directly refuting specific scien-
tific claims or by putting forward a way of thinking anti-
thetical to scientific methods.  But in their zeal to defend 
science, they sometimes lose sight of the fact that science is 
simply a heuristic based on its own unsupportable assump-
tions.  This need not be a problem – indeed, the tentative 
nature of scientific claims is one of science’s great strengths, 
since it facilitates a strong culture of critique.  It only be-
comes a problem if scientists are incautious about the scope 
of the metaphysical claims they make, as in the case of the 
atheist scientist. 
  Religion is a social phenomenon that constituted a critical 
aspect of the lives of most humans beings since before the 
beginning of recorded history.  It stretches credibility be-
yond the breaking point to suggest either that this is not an 
essential aspect of human nature or that nothing of value 
can be found within the rich creations humans have 
wrought in its name.   But to avoid essential conflict with 
science, religion must also moderate its metaphysical claims.  
At the very least, it must openly embrace a more open and 
critical internal culture as well as eschew supernaturalism in 
any form that would undermine the scientific investigation 
of the natural world. 
  Wouldn’t it be nice if we could have our metaphysical 
cake and eat it too?  If we could, on the one hand, retain 
the scientific worldview with its unprecedented ability to 
explain the nature world, while on the other hand adopt a 
wider perspective which allows us to believe our lives have 
purpose and meaning of the sort religions historically have 
provided.  Perhaps this is something we should actively 
seek.   
4. The Complex Universe 
And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of 
each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend 
to progress towards perfection. – C. Darwin 
 
  There is a growing movement within science that may 
offer a possible compromise along these lines.  It spans a 
number of disciplines, from physics to chemistry to infor-
mation science, and there is not yet even a shared vocabu-
lary, so it goes by various names (e.g., the epic of evolution, 
big history, cosmic evolution).  The basic idea, however, is 
that the universe has a structure which naturally manifests 
increasing levels of complexity over time through an evolu-
tionary process.  It’s beyond the scope of this paper to ar-
gue for this position in detail, so below I will only trace the 
general outlines. 
  Of course, the idea that the universe is progressive is 
nothing new.  But previous discussions have been hobbled 
by non-natural metaphysical commitments and anthropo-
centrism, among other things. Yet increasingly, scientists 
are using rigorous scientific techniques to model the uni-
verse in general, and life in particular, as a system that 
spontaneously produces complexity [50,51,52,53,54].  A 
proposed candidate for the first biological law ever discov-
ered has even arisen that predicts increasing complexity as a 
fundamental property of all evolving organisms [55].  To-
gether, these suggest that it may be possible to view the 
universe as exhibiting a purpose, in some sense of that term, 
without the baggage that has been associated with this idea 
in the past. 
  It’s not just that the universe gets more complex, it’s that 
it manifests a series of processes that are increasingly adept 
at creating complexity, generating powerful feedback.  
Thus, the rate at which complexity is generated seems to be 
increasing as well, particularly once the ability to produce 
cultural information comes on the scene [56,57,58,59].   
The universe has evolved from a smear of energy and sim-
ple matter only a cosmologist could find interesting to a 
place populated by at least one species capable of contem-
plating its place in the universe. Stars formed in a universe 
of hydrogen and began manufacturing heavier elements.  
Over time, these elements formed planets where ever more 
complex chemical interactions became possible.  Eventu-
ally, a complexity threshold was passed and living systems 
arose, enabling the new dynamic of evolution by natural 
selection, increasing the rate of complexification exponen-
tially. These life forms passed through a series of major 
transitions (e.g., eukaryotes, multicellularity), with more 
capacity to generate novelty at each level, until some or-
ganisms develop the mental capacity to make sociality, rea-
son and culture possible [60,61].  The resulting cultural 
evolution creates science and other rational disciplines, 
within which the evolution of ideas increases the rate of 
complexification even further. 
  The complex universe hypothesis holds that someone 
with sufficient knowledge of the scientific principles and 
the initial conditions could have predicted, moments after 
the big bang, that a universe populated by stars, planets, and 
complex chemistry would come into being. He could also 
predict the evolution of living organisms, the emergence of 
intelligence, and the rise of cultural systems.  If this hy-
pothesis is correct, it means that the universe produces the 
kinds of complexity we see all around us, including our 
scientific culture, in a perfectly natural fashion.  Intuitively, 
we feel that complexity requires some kind of directive plan, 
implying a rational designer – a point the proponents of 
intelligent design creationism make much of [62,63].  But 
if the complex universe hypothesis is correct, there is no 
more need to postulate supernatural forces to explain our 
existence than to explain the formation of crystals forming 
in a supersaturated solution – under the right conditions, 
these things happen spontaneously. 
  We do need to be clear about what this hypothesis is not 
saying.  The claim is not that the universe is deterministic, 
just that it is sufficiently predictable that some major trends 
can be predicted with confidence.  This is similar to the 
way in which, although quantum phenomena are thought to 
be intrinsically random at the level of individual events, it is 
nevertheless possible to predict the behavior of large ag-
gregates of such events with enormous (indeed, unprece-
dented) precision. Biological evolution is actually a process 
fueled by random variation, so it is only possible to predict 
events that are probable in the aggregate, despite random 
variation in particular cases.  It would therefore be absurd 
to claim that the universe was destined to produce humans 
if by “human” we mean something with all the peculiarities 
of biology and culture that we possess.  The patterns of 
evolution are predictable only in their broadest strokes – 
given the right conditions, we can predict that life will 
probably evolve, become multicellular, develop sociality 
and reason, etc.  But we can’t typically predict which spe-
cies will develop which type of trait in which form at which 
point in time.  And we certainly could not predict, 10 sec-
onds after the big bang, that a species of hairy, intelligent 
ape with arms and legs would arise on the third planet or-
biting Sol, much less that one of them would one day write 
a paper for the American Journal of Sociological Research 
discussing the predictive limits of the complex universe 
hypothesis.   
   We do not yet know whether this hypothesis is true.  
What we can say right now is that it is broadly consistent 
with what our best science tells us about the universe. It 
also seems an empirically tractable question we will one 
day resolve – for example, when we have much better data 
about the distribution of life in the universe and the system-
atic principles governing its evolution.  In other words, it’s 
a legitimate scientific hypothesis on which we do not yet 
have definitive data.  I will thus leave the empirical debate 
to future scientists.  
  But what would the extra scientific implications be 
should this trend be confirmed?  We could, as the atheist 
scientist will urge, view it as a brute fact that is not in need 
of further explanation.  But doing this creates two sorts of 
problems, one scientific and one extra scientific. First, when 
science adopts the notion of a kosmos, it accepts the mis-
sion of explaining the universe. Generally speaking, we 
think that to explain something is to show how it is at least 
more likely than not to occur [64].  A view of the essential 
nature of the universe as either mysterious or the result of 
pure happenstance is thus at the very least less than ideal.  
It’s not that there is anything inconsistent about this idea – 
there isn’t – it’s just that this undermines the concept of a 
kosmos on which science is built, suggesting that at some 
level the universe is simply not explicable via human reason.   
Second, it is difficult to see how we could derive any sense 
of meaning or purpose from an accident of history.  Indeed, 
this difficulty may go a long way towards explaining why 
humans beings created theistic religions in the first place, 
since these allow us to believe that the universe has a struc-
ture in which we have a meaningful place, despite our pro-
found ignorance of its details.  We have seen how a sense 
of meaning and purpose is something humans need deeply 
and will pursue vigorously regardless of what science says.  
Thus, in the same way it’s a mistake for religions to hinder 
the investigation of the natural world when they can avoid it, 
it’s also a mistake for science to create needless conflict 
between that investigation and the search for meaning. 
 What is the alternative to traditional accounts of reli-
gion then?  One possibility is to imbue the complexity 
trend with value, which is not so much a fact about the uni-
verse as a choice about how we wish to view ourselves in 
relation to the facts we have.  Just as science is careful to 
make only the minimal assumptions necessary to allow for 
the possibility of rational inquiry, here we need to adopt a 
minimal set of attitudes necessary to derive meaning from 
the universe science reveals to us.  This seems to require 
two fundamental elements: 
1. A deep appreciation, perhaps even a reverence, for 
the universal nature of this trend (in space, in time, 
in the levels of reality it encompasses, etc.).  
Some view this kind of association with a reality 
that transcends our own personal (and even hu-
manity’s collective) interests as the very essence of 
religion [65,66].   
2. The notion that complexity is a good in the sense 
that it is something we should both value and fos-
ter.  It is difficult to see how we could derive a 
robust sense of meaning and purpose from the 
mere universality of a natural property.  For ex-
ample, we are all massive objects subject to gravity.  
One can certainly appreciate the universality of 
this claim, but by itself this does little to assuage a 
postmodern sense of purposelessness. 
  To some extent, these ideas take us into the realms of 
religion and ethics where many a scientist fears to tread.  
Certainly these are not areas amenable to empirical investi-
gation in the same way scientific questions are, and when 
scientists do venture into this territory they sometime do so 
in an unfortunately naïve fashion.  But it’s also important 
to realize that scientists already make this sort of move rou-
tinely, whether they realize it or not as it’s (fortunately) a 
rare scientist who would argue that there are no moral 
goods, even if they may see these most clearly in the epis-
temic virtues of their discipline. 
  But neither claim is entirely divorced from science and 
its empirical techniques either.  We should not build a 
sense of meaning on something that does not actually exist, 
and the existence of a complexity trend in an open empirical 
question (if a difficult one to resolve at present).  And if a 
trend does exist, the details of its structure and function may 
help us specify precisely what it is we should be reverent of.  
Similarly, if we are going to be thoroughly naturalistic in 
our approach, refusing to engage in supernaturalism, then 
we need to think carefully about whether and to what extent 
we can enrich the traditional discussion of moral values 
with empirical knowledge.  Ethical theorists tend to want 
to draw a line in the sand between ethics and the empirical 
world, but if we view ethics as another aspect of a purely 
natural complexity trend, then there is surely much that 
fields like psychology, sociology, evolution and even eco-
nomics can contribute to our moral understanding – as re-
cent explorations have suggested [67,68,69]. 
  This kind of approach is certainly not new, even if ex-
plicit discussion of its dynamics are rare.  It may be that 
that the complex universe hypothesis is just one of a family 
of attempts to derive meaning from a purely natural uni-
verse that are gaining ground in the popular imagination.  
For example, deep ecology attempts to combine an appreci-
ation for the universality of complex ecological relation-
ships with the view that this complex ecological system has 
value (and even rights) we are obligated to respect 
[70,71,72,73].  There thus may be any number of ways to 
realize this kind of minimal leap of faith other than the 
complexity trend hypothesis.   
  Such pluralism might seem to undercut any claim to ob-
jective truth, but this conclusion would be hasty.  Just as 
we can predict the broad contours of an evolutionary tra-
jectory but not its details, the fact that variants of the same 
basic approach are emerging could indicate an important 
convergence.  It may thus be a common feature of the 
evolution of social/cultural/rational beings that they begin 
with a supernatural conception of the universe and their 
place in it, only to abandon this is favor of more minimal 
leaps of faith under the influence of scientific culture.  It 
could even be that some specific features of the ethical ori-
entation of all rational creatures, wherever they emerge in 
the universe, are shared [59].  There is thus the possibility 
that these beliefs, even if they are subjective and contingent 
in some ways, are also objective (or at last inter-subjective) 
in others.  If so, this would allows us to offer a response to 
the postmodern dilemma similar to what Kant offered in 
response to the problem of induction: if such beliefs are 
universal features of all beings with the rational capacity to 
contemplate such matters, then we will at least never lose a 
debate concerning their truth, since all creatures capable of 
joining the conversation will agree.  
5. Conclusion 
Before I came here I was confused about this subject.  
Having listened to your lecture I am still confused,  
but on a higher level. – E. Fermi 
 
  The current standoff between science and religion owes 
much to the history of ideas, and in particular the postmod-
ern movement, though in ways few of the interlocutors are 
consciously aware of.  Modern science tends to borrow 
from postmodernism a deep skepticism about the possibility 
of any ultimate truths, especially as put forward by tradi-
tional authority structures like the church.  Like Hume 
before them, scientists don’t worry too much about their 
own metaphysical assumptions.  This would be less of a 
problem if they were at least aware of the difficulties, how-
ever, as it might make them more cautious in their opposi-
tion to leaps of faith in general.  By way of contrast, post-
modern philosophers are at least keenly aware of the psy-
chological dilemma created by rejecting all sources of 
meaning as well as the extreme difficulty of filling this void 
without the traditional guarantors of objectivity.  For their 
part, religions tend to embrace the postmodern leap of faith 
too fully, using the fact that something is a faith claim to 
insulate all aspects of faith from critical scrutiny, opening 
Pandora’s box to release a bewildering, and sometimes 
dangerous, array of beliefs.  It seems as if all parties to the 
debate are talking past each other in important ways, pre-
venting what most might view as a desirable compromise. 
How can we break this stalemate? 
  Those with a scientific worldview must begin to seriously 
consider the possibility that a minimal step of faith (as op-
posed to a leap) can be taken in ways that enrich rather than 
hinder the efforts of science to make sense of the universe.   
Stepping into the a minimalist kind of faith may actually 
help preserve our dedication to rational inquiry while al-
lowing us to reap the psychological benefits of meaning and 
purpose science alone can not provide.   
  But the fact that there is a place for faith does not mean 
that all faiths are beyond critique.  Those coming from  
traditional faith perspectives must embrace a far more criti-
cal attitude towards faith claims and, in particular, strive to 
purge themselves of the sort of supernaturalism that no one 
dedicated to rational explanation can countenance.  And it 
is critical that this go beyond paying mere lip service to an 
abstract ideal – religions need to actively encourage their 
followers to critique elements of faith as circumstances 
change, providing concrete structures and processes to al-
low faith traditions to evolve more rapidly. 
  I put forward the complex universe hypothesis as an ex-
ample of a scientific hypothesis capable of supporting a 
minimal step of faith that could help bridge the gap between 
the faith and science communities.  While it is not sci-
ence’s job to develop extra scientific claims that would al-
low us to find meaning and purpose, there’s also nothing 
about such a move that science need oppose.  This ap-
proach simply adds a psychological dimension to our exist-
ing scientific understanding of the universe.  It explains 
why we exist in a big sense – we are neither accidents of an 
uncaring universe nor products of an intelligent designer, 
but instead integral parts of a universal process that trans-
cends our own existence.  Viewing the creation of com-
plexity in a purposeful way doesn’t so much change the 
facts we believe in as change our attitude towards them.  
  Of course, even if we enthusiastically embrace meaning-
ful universal complexity, it will not answer all questions.  
People will continue to wonder why the universe has this 
character of complexification, and one possible answer is to 
insert the will of a supernatural creator.  But this is not a 
problem unique to this worldview, since it’s a move that can 
be made in response to any worldview, even that of the 
“hardest” science [74,75,76].  The important point is that 
there is nothing intrinsic to the complex universe system 
that requires a supernatural explanation.    
  To inject a pessimistic note, it must be allowed that this 
proposal may ultimately be unworkable.  Traditional reli-
gions may be too wed to supernaturalism to change their 
ways fundamentally.  What’s much worse is the possibility 
that most people may continue to prefer the simple answers 
to complex questions such systems provide, in which case 
any alternative along the lines I propose here will have a 
very limited following.  I can only hope that I have identi-
fied a logical space in which a compromise could occur – it 
remains to be seen whether anyone will actually occupy it 
and how comfortable its accommodations will prove to be. 
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